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The paper analyses the links between a binding minimum wage and union bargaining. A dual labour market model is 
developed where the first sector outcome is characterised by bargaining between unions and firms, while in the second 
sector firms have to pay a statutory minimum wage. It is shown that a minimum wage increase has negative 
employment effects only if the bargaining outcome is described by the Nash solution. However, this result does not 
hold if the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is applied to model union bargaining. A higher minimum wage can then lead to 
more employment in the unionised sector and to a lower unemployment rate. 
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The consequences of minimum wages have been widely and controversially discussed
among economists and policymakers. Common wisdom suggests that minimum
wages lead to higher unemployment rates. This consensus, however, was unhinged
by the groundbreaking studies by Card & Krueger (1994, 1995). They present
quasi-experimental evidence claiming that minimum wage increases do not cause
negative employment e￿ects. These ￿ndings launched an intense discussion and
started to change the opinion within the economics profession. Fuller & Geide-
Stevenson (2003) report that in 1990, 62% of academic economists in the USA agreed
with the statement that minimum wages increase unemployment among young and
unskilled workers, 19.5% partly agreed while 17.5% disagreed. One decade later,
these numbers have changed signi￿cantly. Now only 46% of respondents agreed
while 28% partly agreed and 27% disagreed.
As a response to Card & Krueger (1994, 1995), a growing body of literature ￿nds
very mixed evidence about the minimum wage e￿ects on employment.1 Neumark &
Wascher (2006) review evidence from a large number of minimum wage studies and
rehashed the discussion. Altogether, it can be stated that the empirical evidence
about minimum wage e￿ects on employment is not conclusive. Thus, there is a
need for theoretical models explaining the fact that higher minimum wages may
lead to higher employment. Simple textbook analysis predicts that introducing
a wage ￿oor above the equilibrium wage in a competitive labour market causes
unemployment. More comprehensive theoretical contributions to this debate build
on the monopsony model (Stigler 1946). However, the empirical ￿ndings do not
support neither the assumption of a pure competitive labour market nor of employers
acting as monopsonists. Alternative approaches being empirically more relevant
1Considerable studies include, amongst others, Deere et al. (1995), Dolado et al. (1996), Kennan
(1995), Portugal & Cardoso (2006), and the discussion between Neumark & Wascher (2000) and
Card & Krueger (2000).
2particularly introduced e￿ciency wages (Jones 1987, Manning 1995, Rebitzer &
Taylor 1995) or search and matching models (Berg 2003, Flinn 2006, Masters 1999,
Swinnerton 1996) into a minimum wage framework. But somewhat surprisingly, the
impact of minimum wages in unionised labour markets has rarely been analysed.2
Since both minimum wages and union bargaining power coexist in most European
labour markets, this paper aims at combining these two facts in a dual labour market
model and shows that a higher minimum wage can yield higher employment.
The focus of the paper is to shed some light on the speci￿c bargaining framework.
In order to model union wage bargaining, labour economics literature has empha-
sised the solution concept proposed by Nash (1950). Other bargaining solutions,
e. g. the approach by Kalai & Smorodinsky (1975), have been mostly neglected
although exhibiting some interesting features. This axiomatic approach builds on
the criticism of some of Nash’s axioms, especially the independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Kalai & Smorodinsky (1975) replaced this axiom with the property of
monotonicity and prove that there is only one bargaining rule satisfying their axioms.
Their solution consists of equalizing the parties’ sacri￿ce relative to the maximum
bene￿t they can expect. Although McDonald & Solow (1981) considered both the
Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky (henceforth KS) solutions, subsequent work on
wage bargaining has ignored the latter one.3 One possible reason to explain this
ignorance is the di￿culty of doing comparative statics, whereas the Nash approach
exhibits mathematical convenience and a well-known game-theoretic foundation by
Binmore et al. (1986). However, this ignorance seems hard to defend mainly because
of two reasons. First, there exists a game-theoretic foundation by Moulin (1984) im-
plementing the KS bargaining solution in a non-cooperative game. Second, current
bargaining situations can be often described by mutual relative concessions of, say,
2The most notable exception is Cahuc et al. (2001). To some extent, Cardona & SÆnchez-Losada
(2006) and Roberts et al. (2000) also deal with the topic.
3Exceptions are Alexander (1992) and Gerber & Upmann (2006).
3a union and a ￿rm (Economist 2002). Furthermore, economic experiments provide
evidence for the view that people compare relative payo￿s (Nydegger & Owen 1974,
Roth & Malouf 1979). The Nash approach cannot capture this stylised fact because
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. Replacing this axiom by the
monotonicity axiom, as it has been done by Kalai & Smorodinsky (1975), allows
individuals to compare relative payo￿s and is thus in line with the experimental
evidence (Alexander 1992).
The paper addresses theses di￿erences by constructing a dual labour market model
with a unionised and a minimum wage sector where bargaining in the union sector
is analysed under both the Nash and the KS solution. It can be shown that the
policy conclusions derived from the model depend signi￿cantly on the underlying
bargaining approach. Applying the Nash solution yields clear policy implications.
A higher minimum wage increases wages and decreases employment in both sectors.
Following this result it can be argued that unemployment can be reduced by lowering
the minimum wage. However, these policy implications are not as straightforward
if the KS solution is applied. Then the overall unemployment e￿ect is ambiguous
and depends on the speci￿c form of ￿rm’s production and worker’s utility functions.
Hence, both bargaining approaches might imply diametrical policy implications.
The paper is organised as follows. The basic framework of the model is outlined
in section 2. Section 3 analyses the wage and employment determination under
the Nash and the KS solution. The comparative static results of a minimum wage
increase are discussed in section 4, while section 5 contains ￿nal remarks.
42 The Structure of the Economy
2.1 Firms
I consider an economy with a dual labour market. Wage and employment in the
￿rst sector are determined by bargaining between unions and ￿rms. Firms in the
second sector must pay a statutory minimum wage.4 There are ¸ homogeneous ￿rms
and the same number of unions in the unionised sector, while the number of ￿rms
in the minimum wage sector is normalised to unity. Let N denote the available
workforce per ￿rm in the union sector and Z = ¸N the total number of workers in
the economy. The production technology of a representative ￿rm in the unionised
sector can be described by the function f(L), while production in the minimum wage
sector is characterised by g(M). Both production functions obey the usual Inada
conditions, i.e. f0(L) > 0, f00(L) < 0, g0(M) > 0 and g00(M) < 0, while L · N
and M denote employment per ￿rm, respectively. All ￿rms sell their output in a
competitive goods market, where the output price is normalised to unity. Hence,
the pro￿t of a representative ￿rm in the unionised sector can be written as
Π = f(L) ¡ wL; (1)
with w denoting the bargained wage.
The second sector is a competitive labour market where ￿rms have to pay a statutory
minimum wage wm. Unemployment arises since the minimum wage is assumed to be





4Therewith I cover the stylised fact that in many European labour markets sectors with and without
union coverage coexist with minimum wage sectors.
52.2 Unions and Workers
Each worker supplies inelastically one unit of labour. The union covers all workers
at the ￿rm-level and is assumed to maximise the expected utility of a representative
member:5
EU(w;L) = lu(w) + (1 ¡ l)Eu( ¯ w); (3)
where u(:) characterises the state-independent individual utility function, with u0(:) >
0 and u00(:) < 0. With probability l = L
N, a union member can ￿nd a job in the
￿rst sector, while the probability of getting an alternative income ¯ w is given by
1 ¡ l = N¡L
N . The expected utility from this alternative income Eu( ¯ w) equals the
utility of getting a job in the minimum wage sector or becoming unemployed. This
can be expressed by
Eu( ¯ w) = pu(w
m) + (1 ¡ p)u(b); (4)
with b denoting unemployment bene￿t. Both, the union and the ￿rm, take the










@L ! 0, i.e. neither the union nor the ￿rm has any impact on
the outcome in the second labour market.6
5This formulation has been popular in recent theoretical work on union bargaining (Booth 1995).
Empirical evidence is provided, amongst others, by Pencavel (1991).
6Endogenising the probability p would not change the qualitative results but only calculations get
more complicated.
63 Wage and Employment Determination
3.1 The Nash Solution
I ￿rst analyse the bargaining outcome of the generalised Nash solution (Nash 1950,
Binmore et al. 1986). The ￿rm and the union are assumed to bargain simultaneously
over both the wage and the level of employment (McDonald & Solow 1981).7 Empir-
ical evidence for the e￿cient bargaining can be found, amongst others, in MaCurdy
& Pencavel (1986) and Svejnar (1986). MaCurdy & Pencavel (1986) show for the
American newspaper industry and its primary labour union, the International Typo-
graphical Union, that the e￿cient bargaining model comes closer to reality. Svejnar
(1986) states for the U.S. industry that for many ￿rms and unions the outcome can
be better characterised by e￿cient bargaining.
Wages and employment are chosen as to maximise the weighted product of each
party’s net return from reaching an agreement. Since there is bargaining over both
the wage and the level of employment, the outcome is not constrained to the labour-
demand curve. Hence, the general maximisation problem can be written as
max
w;L
Ω = ± ln
£
EU ¡ E ¯ U
¤
+ (1 ¡ ±)ln
£
Π ¡ ¯ Π
¤
; (5)
where ± 2 [0;1] denotes union’s bargaining power. In case of a disagreement, each
union member ￿nds a job in the second sector with probability p or receives unem-
ployment bene￿t with probability 1 ¡ p. That is, the union’s outside option in the
bargaining E ¯ U is given by (4). Firm’s pro￿t
¡¯ Π
¢
is assumed to be zero in the case
when bargain breaks down. Hence, the Nash maximand can be written as
max
w;L
Ω = ± ln[l(u(w) ¡ pu(w
m) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u(b))] + (1 ¡ ±)ln[f(L) ¡ wL]: (6)
7See Booth (1995) for a comprehensive analysis of union behaviour.
7The labour market equilibrium can be derived from the ￿rst-order conditions of (6).
Di￿erentiating (6) with respect to w and L and reformulating yields the contract




u(w) ¡ pu(wm) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u(b)
u0(w)
: (7)
Due to worker’s risk aversion, the right-hand side of (7) increases in w. The slope
of the contract curve (7) has a positive sign and the bargained wage exceeds the




L + (1 ¡ ±)f
0(L) (8)
indicates that the bargained wage equals the weighted sum of the average and the
marginal product of labour, where the weights are given by the bargaining power




by the intersection of the contract curve and the rent-division curve.
3.2 The KS Solution
In the following, the labour market outcome is analysed under the assumption that
bargaining is determined by the KS solution. Kalai & Smorodinsky (1975) suggest a
solution where both parties make equal proportional concessions from their respec-
tive favoured points. Furthermore, this solution must be Pareto-e￿cient. That is,
the KS solution is determined by the intersection of the so-called KS curve and the
Pareto curve.
8The KS curve is de￿ned as
±
v1 ¡ ¯ v1
v¤
1 ¡ ¯ v1
= (1 ¡ ±)
v2 ¡ ¯ v2
v¤
2 ¡ ¯ v2
; (9)
with vi denoting the utility from bargaining for each party (with i = 1;2). The
utopia point, i.e. the maximally attainable utility, is denoted by v¤
i and the utility
if bargaining breaks down by ¯ vi. In order to introduce di￿erent bargaining strengths
for both parties, I follow the asymmetric axiomatic solution proposed by Dubra
(2001). As in the Nash approach, ± and 1 ¡ ± denote union’s and ￿rm’s bargaining
power, respectively.
The Pareto curve de￿nes all individually rational outcomes such that union’s indi￿er-
ence curves and ￿rm’s isopro￿t curves are tangent to each other. It can be obtained
by total di￿erentiation of ￿rm’s pro￿t function (1) and union’s utility function (3):






being equivalent to the contract curve (7) in the Nash solution.
In order to describe the labour market outcome, the formal concept of the KS
solution is applied to the union bargaining model. Therefore, (9) has to be speci￿ed
as follows. The utility from reaching a bargain for both parties is described by
union’s utility (3) and ￿rm’s pro￿t function (1):
v1 = lu(w) + (1 ¡ l)(pu(w
m) + (1 ¡ p)u(b))
v2 = f(L) ¡ wL;
where the subscripts 1 and 2 stand for the union and the ￿rm, respectively. The
9respective utility in the case of disagreement is given by
¯ v1 = pu(w
m) + (1 ¡ p)u(b)
¯ v2 = 0:
In a next step, the utopia points of both parties have to be obtained. That is, I
calculate the respective optimal wage and employment levels the union and the ￿rm
want to achieve. First, union utility is maximised subject to the condition that
￿rm’s pro￿t is at least zero:
max
w;L
U = lu(w) + (1 ¡ l)(pu(w
m) + (1 ¡ p)u(b)) (11)
s:t: f(L) ¡ wL = 0:
The maximising values for v¤
1 can be obtained from the ￿rst-order conditions of (11).
It is easy to see that the solution lies on the contract curve (7). Furthermore, since
￿rms are left with zero pro￿ts, the solution equals the average product of labour.
That is, the optimal wage and employment levels from the union’s point of view
(w¤;L¤) are implicitly given by the intersection of the contract and the average
product of labour curve.
The utopia point of the ￿rm v¤
2 results from maximising pro￿t subject to union
utility reaching at least the con￿ict point:
max
w;L
Π = f(L) ¡ wL (12)
s:t: u(w) = pu(w
m) + (1 ¡ p)u(b):
The ￿rst-order conditions of (12) yield a solution on the marginal product of labour
curve, i.e. w = f0(L). Moreover, the union will not accept a wage below the outside
10option. This implies the lower wage level ¯ w = u¡1 (pu(wm) + (1 ¡ p)u(b)). Together
with w = f0(L), it de￿nes the ￿rm’s optimal wage and employment levels
¡
¯ w; ¯ L
¢
.
Substituting the values for vi, ¯ vi and v¤
i into (9), I ￿nally end up with the asymmetric
KS curve:
±
l(u(w) ¡ pu(wm) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u(b))
l¤ (u(w¤) ¡ pu(wm) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u(b))





¡ ¯ w¯ L
(13)
with l¤ = L¤




implicitly de￿ned by (10) and (13).
Figure 1 pictures wages and employment in the unionised sector under both, the
Nash and the KS approach. Both solutions lie on the contract curve (CC) be-
tween the utopia points of the ￿rm
¡
¯ w; ¯ L
¢
and the union (w¤;L¤). The Nash result
¡
wN;LN¢
is described by the intersection with the rent-division curve (RDC), while
the intersection of the contract curve with the KS curve (KSC) characterises the
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Figure 1: Labour market outcomes of the Nash and the KS solution.
11A priori, it is not clear which bargaining approach generates a higher wage or em-
ployment level. In general, the solution depends on the the speci￿c form of worker’s
utility and ￿rm’s production function. However, it can be pointed out that both
approaches lead to the same result if the range between the respective utopia points
and the outside options is the same for the union and the ￿rm. Then the denomina-
tors in the KS curve (13) are equal on both sides. The relative gains of both parties
weighted with the respective bargaining power change to weighted absolute gains.
Furthermore, the outcome of the KS and the Nash solution might equal in that case
only if workers are risk-neutral.8 Comparing the rent-division curve (8) and the KS
curve (13) shows that the degree of risk-aversion plays an important role in the KS
solution while it does not in the Nash solution.
4 Comparative Statics and Discussion
The main focus of the paper is on the labour market e￿ect of a minimum wage
increase. Therefore, I analyse the changes in the union wage, in employment in
both sectors and in the total unemployment rate due to a change in the minimum
wage in both the Nash and the KS bargaining solution. Considering the minimum
wage sector, the ￿rst and most obvious result is expressed in
Proposition 1. A minimum wage increase causes less employment in the minimum
wage sector.
This can easily be shown by di￿erentiating the marginal productivity condition in





8See Gerber & Upmann (2006) for an example with linear utility functions yielding the same result
under both approaches.
12The Nash Solution
First, I study the e￿ects of a marginal minimum wage increase under Nash bargain-
ing. The results are summarised in
Proposition 2. A minimum wage increase leads to a higher wage and to a lower
employment level in the unionised sector under Nash bargaining over wages and
employment.
Proof. Rewriting the contract curve (7) and the rent-division curve (8) yields:
Ã
CC = u(w) ¡ pu(w






L + (1 ¡ ±)f
0(L) ¡ w = 0 (15)


























































The wage and employment e￿ects in the unionised sector due to a minimum wage

















































Let ' ´ 1 ¡ ¸L+M
Z denote the rate of unemployment in the economy. Its change








Hence, I end up with
Proposition 3. Under Nash bargaining, a higher minimum wage increases unem-
ployment.
This is straightforward, since according to Propositions 1 and 2 a minimum wage
increase reduces employment in both sectors, i.e. dL
dwm < 0 and dM




Figure 2 pictures the above results indicating the labour market outcome in both
sectors under Nash bargaining. First, a minimum wage increase from wm to wm0
causes an employment reduction from M to M0 in the second sector. Second, the
workers’ outside option rises to ¯ w0. Thus, the contract curve is shifted to CC0. Since
the rent-division curve remains constant, the new wage and aggregate employment
14levels in the unionised sector are given by wN0 and ¸LN0. Hence, the number of
unemployed rises to ΦN0 due to a minimum wage increase because of the direct
e￿ect in the second sector and the indirect e￿ect in the unionised sector. The latter
one occurs because the union sets a mark-up on the minimum wage.
6 6
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
w
¯ w















- ¾ - ¾ - ¾













Figure 2: Labour market e￿ects of a minimum wage increase in the Nash solution.
The KS Solution
In a next step, the comparative static e￿ects are analysed if the bargaining outcome
is characterised by the KS solution.
Proposition 4. Under the KS solution, a minimum wage increase leads to a higher
union wage while the employment e￿ect in the unionised sector is ambiguous.
Proof. Rearranging the KS curve (13) yields the following implicit function:
Ã
KSC = ±L[u(w) ¡ pu(w





¡ ¯ w¯ L
¤
15¡ (1 ¡ ±)L
¤ [u(w
¤) ¡ pu(w
m) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u(b)][f(L) ¡ wL] = 0: (17)









¡ ¯ w¯ L
¤
+ (1 ¡ ±)LL
¤ [u(w
¤) ¡ pu(w
m) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u(b)] > 0
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KSC
L = ± [u(w) ¡ pu(w
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¡ ¯ w¯ L
¤
¡ (1 ¡ ±)L
¤ [f(L) ¡ wL]
¤
< 0:
The negative sign of ÃKSC






¡ ¯ w¯ L
¤
¡(1¡±)L¤ [f(L) ¡ wL] > 0. This is straightforward when the
expression is written as ± L
L¤ > (1¡±)
f(L)¡wL
f(¯ L)¡ ¯ w¯ L. A comparison with the KS curve indi-
cates that the inequality must hold since in (13) there is (u(w) ¡ pu(wm) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u(b)) <
(u(w¤) ¡ pu(wm) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u(b)). The wage and employment e￿ects can now be cal-









































































The di￿erence in the comparative statics between KS and Nash follows from ÃKSC
wm
being negative while ÃN
wm equals zero. In the Nash approach, a minimum wage
increase neither changes the marginal product nor the average product of labour.
The distribution given by the rent-division curve remains constant. Otherwise, in
the KS solution, a higher minimum wage changes the union’s outside option and
the ￿rm’s utopia point thus shifting the KS curve. Overall, I obtain
Proposition 5. If bargaining is characterised by the KS solution, the unemployment
consequences of a rise in the minimum wage are ambiguous.
This follows directly from Proposition 4 and equation (16). Employment in the
second sector declines due to the higher minimum wage. Employment in the ￿rst
sector may rise if the shift of the KS curve is large enough to countervail the shift
of the contract curve.9 If this positive employment e￿ect is larger than the negative
e￿ect in the second sector, overall unemployment declines.
Geometrically, a higher minimum wage shifts both the contract and the KS curve
upwards yielding to an ambiguous employment e￿ect in the unionised sector. These
results are illustrated in ￿gure 3, where I concentrate on the case of a positive




depends on the elasticities of the contract and the
rent-division curve in the ￿rst sector and the labour demand curve in the second
sector.
9See Gerber & Upmann (2006) for a general mathematical analysis of this e￿ect.
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Figure 3: Labour market e￿ects of a minimum wage increase in the KS solution.
Finally, the wage and employment changes due to a minimum wage increase in both
bargaining settings are summarised in table 1.
w L M '
Nash + ¡ ¡ +
KS + +=¡ ¡ +=¡
Table 1: Comparative statics of the Nash and the KS solution.
185 Conclusion
The paper addressed the e￿ects of a statutory minimum wage in a dual labour market
model. Wage and employment in the ￿rst sector are determined by bargaining
between unions and ￿rms. Though the minimum wage binds only in the second
sector, it also a￿ects the unionised sector by serving as part of worker’s outside option
in the bargaining. The crucial feature of the model is the impact of a minimum wage
increase under two di￿erent bargaining approaches, the Nash and the KS solution.
The paper pointed out quantitative wage and employment di￿erences under both
solutions. However, more important with regard to policy implications are the
di￿erent qualitative e￿ects. A higher minimum wage always leads to a higher union
wage, but the employment e￿ect may be ambiguous in the two solutions depending
on the elasticities of worker’s utility and ￿rm’s production function. Hence, the
statement that higher minimum wages cause more unemployment might be wrong
if bargaining is characterised by the KS solution.
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